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ESSAY
FROM RIGHTEOUSNESS TO BEAUTY:
REFLECTIONS ON POETHICS AND
JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION
EMILY FOWLER HARTIGAN*
This essay turns in several directions. One is toward Rich-
ard Weisberg, whose most recent book on law and literature,
Poethics: And Other Strategies of Law and Literature I was diffi-
cult and confounding yet informative for me. One is toward
James Boyd White,2 the founding figure in law and literature as
an academic field, who has attracted considerable critical hostil-
ity in the past few years-to which Weisberg adds with zest.
Thus another turn is toward mediation, as the ostensibly shared
realm of Weisberg and White is of signal value to the study of
law. Yet a further turn is away-not from White, whom I know
and respect, nor Weisberg, whom I have never met-but from a
combative, hierarchic tone of discourse surrounding the founda-
tional patriarchal space of law and literature. Weisberg and
even White make such a grating discourse likely, I venture, by
their near-total exclusion of women from their texts. Rather
than retreating solely to the "other" version of the field, which
Weisberg takes on though ineffectively-the one inhabited by
Robin West, Judith Resnik, Marie Ashe, Drucilla Cornell and a
score of wonderful feminist writers-I want to speak for a new
timbre of conversation, a new openness, even a new dance. I
take name for such a movement as one "from righteousness to
* Adjunct Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Resident, Pendle Hill
Quaker Center for Study and Contemplation. For teaching me about community, love,
and resistance, my thanks to John Snowdon, Pat Snowdon, Carol McShane, and Jim
McShane, and to Benjamin Albrink Fowler, who learned some about each from his
grandfather, Frederick Stockman Albrink (may he rest in peace). This essay is truly the
result of invaluable conversation and solidarity "along the way." My deep gratitude to
Marie Ashe, Sandy Levinson, Howard Lesnick, Uncas MeThenia, Tom Shaffer (a
wonderful Thursday), and James Boyd White, for the journey.
1. RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITER-
ATURE (1992).
2. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990).
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beauty," because of the inherent draw of the goodness of law, its
irresistible poetry, its manifest desirability. Under such a ban-
ner, I cannot begin by criticism but neither can I avoid it.
Before I can elaborate that positive call in relation to law,
wending my way through all those male texts, I need to say this:
I do not believe that any person avoids the terror and emptiness
that is inherent in the move toward the good (or the mutual
movement between us and the good, the relationship), and I do
not believe that law can be true law in this time, without our
movements beyond patriarchy. What I know I do not want, is
to contribute to either a return to prelegal blood feud or to a
feminist patricide mirroring the Greek foundational myth of
law. (In Aeschylus, so the story goes, Athena rejects having
been mothered and acquits Orestes (replacing feud with law)
through denial of the son's blood tie to the mother he has
killed).3 Neither calculative competition nor retributive denial
of the masculine will create a better story. Yet the stakes in law
are blood indeed, even now, and thus my hope is neither to
attain or award victory but to call forth costly, saving
conversation.
Law as conversation is not primarily war through or with
words, but the free yet necessary activity of community-weaving
among people of profound differences. Given the negligible
amount of time White and Weisberg spend conversing with or of
women who have claimed their own voices, my call to them may
seem initially futile. As the practice of such conversations seems
relegated to book dedications and habits of silence about the
feminine in the public sphere, my invitation may seem unlikely
to be welcomed. Yet if I am right in agreeing with these men
that beauty, poetic force, will tell in the end, then I have reason
to hope. For I am concerned with them not primarily because of
their "place," their status, but because I see the world as in one
respect God's wonderful joke: among the always emerging dif-
ferences among persons, men are as mysterious and irresistible
to women as some men have recognized women to be. If men
could remember both the irresistible part and the mystery (for
both men and women), and would open the existing public con-
versation, they might critique and pointedly ignore each other
less violently, and enjoy a new richer company. They might
3. See AESCHYLUS, Eumenides, in 2 AESCHYLUS 269 (Hugh Lloyd-Jones ed., Her-
bert W. Smyth trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1926).
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experience the awesome surprises of difference. They might risk
even heterosexual, 4 interfaith, interracial, textual dance---"the
lateral dance of difference."' 5 We all in the law might become
more and newly-awkwardly and gracefully-human.
In January 1992, I attended the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) annual meeting in San Antonio. A friend
who teaches law and literature had managed to get Columbia
Press to promise her the demonstration copy of Richard Weis-
berg's Poethics. Her glimpses of it at their book stall made it
sound exciting. She and I had connected fairly early during the
convention, right after I had spoken a question that came to me,
with no hint of the rhetorical, to James Boyd White at the Juris-
prudence workshop. In a set of related observations and ques-
tions, I asked White why he called the restricted range of literary
texts he was teaching humanist. (That question has, for me, no
final answer, including any preclusive or judgmental one: the
issue of what represents the human is, I suspect, a life mystery-
struggle.) From one vantage, that question, meant from a pro-
foundly collegial stance, might have seemed pretty ungrateful.
White had been unfailingly kind to me as a colleague. But the
query, a way of taking him as seriously as I know how, was
based on a respect that I find reinforced, perhaps oddly, by the
reflections that my friend's copy of Poethics began. I disagree
with Weisberg's defense of the dated, nearly monochromatic lit-
erary canon, and I am perplexed by White's adherence to it, but
White's fidelity to what Weisberg seems to identify as the "best"
(aside from sheer survival over time, literary Darwinism)-
depth, complexity, "radical" challenge of the conventional in
true poetic form-is what White's writing often embodies and
what Weisberg's, with a very notable exception, does not yet
sustain.
My friend's enthusiasm and the most intriguing title itself,
led me to order Poethics as soon as I arrived at Tulane and found
the bookstore. I was familiar only with secondary references to
Weisberg, an emerging figure in law and literature-though the
book's dust jacket carried Stanley Fish's announcement that
4. This is emphatically not meant as exclusionary, placing heterosexuality above
bisexuality or homosexuality; it is the traditional locus of creative gender difference but
hardly the sole source of such mysterious attraction.
5. Although the Author attributes this phrase to literary critic J. Hillis Miller, she has
been unable to locate it within Miller's work.-eds.
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Weisberg was the "energizing force" in law and literature. The
subject of literature in relation to philosophy, religion, truth, and
law has long been a major intellectual pursuit. Contemporary
thinkers, echoing Plato's concerns with genre, continue to strug-
gle with the relationship between medium of expression and its
content. In this vein, I had just written a review6 of Patricia
Williams's The Alchemy of Race and Rights,7 in which I fol-
lowed the role of poetry into some of my favorite thinkers' ter-
rain, and emerged with a dancing conviction that legal textuality
was a sensuous, inspiring medium of human becoming that
hoped, in the words of Elizabeth Sewell's book, "To Be a True
Poem."8
The idea of the aesthetic force of writing as its integral mea-
sure has been tackled by European and American writers who
have related the poetic, the religious and the philosophical. 9
Such an interrelationship has been key to the projects of philoso-
phers like Harvard's Stanley Cavell and deconstruction's Jac-
ques Derrida, because who we are and what we say are so
fundamentally related. The manifestation of "truth," many of
those struggling with these threads suggest, is contextual, non-
propositional, lived with the vibration of the Word' ° that illumi-
nates rather than "proves." The lines between philosophy and
literature blur, and the stance of "judgment" is more like a
reflective aesthetic evaluation than a critique through formal
logic. Law is, as Weisberg and White agree, more art than
science.
Thus, such a learned-looking book that talked of the
"poetic method for law, or how the law means" 1 as its central
theme, promised a rich read. I had been rereading G.K. Ches-
terton's The Man Who Was Thursday and was ready to be
delightfully disoriented by the apparent conundrums of another,
as yet unmet, "poet for the law."'
2
I may have been saved from a worse experience because my
own bad habit-no longer applied to fiction as it was when
acquired in my childhood-of looking first at the end of a book,
6. Emily Fowler Hartigan, Make the Ring in Your Mind, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271
(1991) (book review).
7. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
8. ELIZABETH SEWELL, To BE A TRUE POEM (1979).
9. See infra note 64.
10. SIMONE WEIL, WAITING FOR GOD 124 (Emma Crawford trans., 1951).
11. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 5.
12. G.K. CHESTERTON, THE MAN WHO WAS THURSDAY (1935).
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prevailed. At the end of Poethics is a section on James Boyd
White. 13 I ran through it quickly, to taste, before I sat down to
read in right order. The taste was bitter, harsh, confusing. By
the time I resampled and then read more systematically through
the book, I may have gotten some sense of the source of that
brittleness, a sense that taps in me the desire to work toward
something key to what White says we do in telling our stories.
We make habitable worlds together, with stories. White says we
can only tell the stories that are tolerable.1 4 That is not a stan-
dard that I see White taking lightly-ironically, it is his very
fidelity to resisting the intolerable that limits his range in my
view, but that limit may be nothing more than the limit that any
one human must have (and/or a time of limitation that will per-
haps be moved past). The double irony for me is that Weisberg,
by testing the boundaries of the intolerable, also contributes
something very different to the story of law and literature than
what that bitter taste detected. Weisberg would do better to
concentrate on what he does well rather than indulging in
what-as he himself tells us-Robin West calls his "anarchical
and idiosyncratic" commentary.1 5
Weisberg's contribution, which makes him different from
White, and valuable in his difference, is to tell a story that is
unavoidably his own. He teaches at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Yeshiva University. He tells us, as he has before
in his earlier work, about the legal community in Vichy France
in the face of the racial laws against Jews, and his story is pro-
foundly painful. The first response part of me had as a reader
was identical to the response Richard Posner gave: "What
would Weisberg have [the accused French lawyer] do?"1 6 But
that response is not sufficient. Weisberg's text tells us with an
eloquent relentlessness that he is still in pain over what was done
to his people. The tenacity over the terror, the desperation, the
famine of the Jews in France, is a fidelity to Weisberg's exper-
ienced story. The reader may hope to hear that story not as an
accusation-though there is always that danger in expressed
pain that is set in ethical terms-so much as something to call
13. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 224-50.
14. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC
AND POETICS OF THE LAW 168-74 (1985).
15. Robin West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature
Movement, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129 n.3 (1988), noted in WEISBERG, supra note 1, at
268-69 n.26.
16. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 169.
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forth healing response. Such reader response may be simply a
new awareness of something that memory should not let dim:
the manifestation in history of human brokenness beyond
calculation.
And it is such direct contact with personal human broken-
ness and with Otherness, which I find missing in White's writ-
ing. But, unlike Weisberg and White's other critics, 17 that is not
something which leads me to judgment. Taking White at his
word, I continue to invite him to conversation. The main reason
I do so is that I read his texts as moving toward a deeper
response to that invitation of a fragmented-and-whole life which
he has described with increasing eloquence but also with increas-
ing tension. Critics like Sanford Levinson see him moving too
slowly18; Weisberg sees him pretending to move but in reality
unmoving.19 I see him as moving in his own way, in his own
time. It would be tragic if those who really see in his portraits of
conversation and translation something inspiring,2" drove him
further away from contemporary conversation in the Law and
Literature community by premature rejection, or simply by
mistake.
The mistake I suggest is highly intuitive, but it begins with
my own sensations discerned in reflection on White's texts.
When I read Levinson's review I see the perception of (Levin-
son's word) "betrayal" 21 that a son might have before he realizes
that his father is "moving too slowly," mainly because the son
has come into his own more than he himself realizes. 2 That is
some part of why I experience White's writing as both beauti-
ful-and paternal.2 3 For me, the end of patriarchy is not the
17. Even the most tenderhearted, like Sanford Levinson, who expresses anguish, not
accusation, in my reading, appear to pass judgment on White. See Sanford Levinson, Con-
versing About Justice, 100 YALE L.J. 1855, 1878 (1991).
18. Id.
19. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 255.
20. See, eg., id. at 225; Levinson, supra note 17.
21. Levinson, supra note 17, at 1878.
22. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1991) (essay/book review).
23. After writing the initial draft of this review, I read two things that make this
intuition poignant for me. One, written by Susan Mann, finds White "patemal"-and
domineering, coercive, locked, and imperial. Susan Mann, Note: The Universe and the
Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as Writer and Reader, 41 STAN. L. REv. 959, 990
(1989). That is not my sense of the paternal in White (nor is the Oedipal sense that Harold
Bloom conveys in HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973), the second
postdraft piece I read). Mann might profit from J. Hillis Miller, Parable and Performative
in the Gospels and in Modern Literature, in HUMANIZING AMERICA'S ICONIC BOOK: SOCI-
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waste of patricide, however, and Weisberg treads too much of
that territory. Nor is the end of patriarchy the end of the
growth of the former parent. It is a time when daughters and
sons move away, gain their own voices, and then return to talk
not only with one another but also with their parents, in new
relations.
Robin West some years back wrote, in her characteristically
powerful way, of the Freudian primal hoard and the institution
of law after the murder of the father, motivated by the guilt of
the sons.24 My enterprise about law intends to intensify its turn
from an instrument and occasion of guilt toward its quality as
the desirable lining-through of life among persons in commu-
nity. Weisberg's carelessness-and apparent competitiveness-
endangers community, creating a needless violence that is not
likely to invite into conversation a man whose texts resolutely
call law by its always aspiring names of meaning and justice.
Weisberg cannot extract blessing by invective. Yet he places
White in a position that can be avoided only by paternal blessing
or paternal violence, or by absence. Weisberg's scathing account
of White leaves little if any space for a response that would seem
likely to "make a world" in which he and White could talk con-
structively. It also has the tone of competition for dominance
that reinforces, not replaces, patriarchy.
How does Weisberg concoct his tale of the sad end of the
once "promising" White? Weisberg says that White began with
the ostensible aim of the personal enrichment of the reader.25
Yet eventually, as the opportunities (one might cynically say
the "market") grew for Law and Literature, White gradually
adjusted his position (his "translation"?). He knows how to
play the academic game and seems by his method of reading
others to value his own place in the hierarchy.26
To maintain that place, Weisberg suggests, White's current
vision is misanthropic. No one else but White is worth conver-
ETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE CENTENNIAL ADDRESSES 1980, at 57 (Gene M. Tucker &
Douglas A. Knight eds., 1982), for why a parable writer like Jorge Luis Borges and a writer
of "double movement" like White, are not necessarily prisoners of their books. Also, there
may be good patriarchs, although the writing and practice of one of my very favorite
patriarchs (his term) Tom Shaffer suggests that the best are working themselves out of the
job gracefully. Conversation with Tom Shaffer.
24. Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and
Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 817 (1986).
25. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 245.
26. Id. (footnote omitted).
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sation, Weisberg charges.27 Weisberg attributes such lack of
engagement to White's disdain. Having tapped White's notion
of ethics as "respect for the other" Weisberg concludes "If one
thing emerges clearly from [Justice As Translation,]2  it is that
White has precious little respect for others. ' 29 Weisberg then
footnotes White regarding Justice Douglas, making clear that in
Weisberg's lexicon White is not in the same category with Doug-
las. Weisberg notes that there is "mean-spiritedness about the
writings of others abroad" in White's text.30
Earlier, Weisberg has called White dishonest, dictatorial,
colonial. 31 He finds that White's ways of attempting the "talk-
ing two ways" that might be recognized as akin to paradoxical
or dialogical movement, to conversation, "also never ring true as
aspiring toward honesty. '32 He finds that White sets up a
"duplicitous scenario," only to soften it by a "disingenuous end-
ing. ,33 Weisberg concludes that "as a blueprint for an ethos of
'the world' White's book utterly fails."
34
These are among the most distasteful of the charges Weis-
berg makes. Are they true? Is Weisberg's basic critique true? Is
White sitting at the academic apex, deviously impervious to any-
one currently writing either literature or commentary on law
and literature (and, one must ask, Richard Weisberg in particu-
lar)? I will be honest: the more I read, the more I became con-
vinced that Weisberg is like the student who argues passionately
again and again-despite the teacher's trying to point out that,
at the student's best, they are saying the same thing. His argu-
ments against White are transparently against his own enter-
prise. Further, he engages in the most obvious of the
exclusionary tacks attributable to White, ruminating in the same
old masculine canon himself. Too much of Weisberg's remarka-
ble energy is not transformed into aesthetically effective talk, but
uselessly spun into disjointed, even malformed critique.
This errancy begins in the simplest way: in the footnotes,
27. Id. at 305 n.122.
28. WHITE, supra note 2.
29. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 245.
30. Id. at 305 n. 122. Levinson also notes that White does not engage contemporary
discourses, such as those of Derrida and the feminists, or his own critics. Levinson, supra
note 17, at 1873-78.
31. Id. passim.
32. Id. at 246.
33. Id. at 248.
34. Id. at 249.
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he says that he praises White for being repetitive, because that
marks White's consistency. 35 Yet in the Preface, he begins his
condemnation by calling White repetitive.36 He calls White's
prose "slippery" 37 at one point, "clear and invariably coherent"
at another.38 But the most central self-destructive move is that
Weisberg's arguments against White are arguments against
poethics-and they are not good writing, not good poetry, not,
as White's texts often are, cogent, inspiring or beautiful. The
movement to beauty and its relationship with truth is as old as
civilization, but it is no better illustrated than in the Book of
Job,39 as I will discuss below. The tragedy of Weisberg is that he
destroys the best of what is his own, as he attacks his patriarchal
figure.' "Honor thy father and thy mother" is a counsel of self-
respect, and Weisberg should be more careful of himself.
Poethics begins with promise. Weisberg tells us he will
involve us "in the delightful task of associating two major
human enterprises: establishing justice and telling stories. "41
He claims he will defend what he concedes is the "establishment
male" canon on the basis of its iconoclasm, its rebellion, its move
to "undermine virtually every sacred belief of Western cul-
ture." 42 He tells us that the attempt to restate stories or litera-
ture would impoverish not only their beauty, but also their very
meaning-words mean through transfiguring thought itself, and
all judicial opinions depend "on the appropriateness of the fit-
the fluid harmony-between the words used and the aspiration
toward justice that every legal pronouncement should
embody. ' 43 He so fully equates form and substance that he con-
cludes "that poor craftsmanship even on the Supreme Court
ultimately brings an opinion down." 44 This seems no less than a
promise that the might of true stories makes right, that positive
35. Id. at 301 n.96.
36. Id. at xiv.
37. Id. at 244-45.
38. Id. at 303 n.108.
39. THE BooK OF JOB (Stephen Mitchell trans., 1987).
40. Even Bloom in The Anxiety of Influence suggests that one must be a truly "strong
poet" to engage in the Oedipal "misreading" of the progenitor text. See, e.g., BLOOM,
supra note 23, at 5-14.
41. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at ix.
42. Id. at xii.
43. Id at 7.




law is as smoke before the force of the right words, of poetic
integrity. Law, he says further, "is utterly dependent on lan-
guage; better, it is, utterly, language.
'45
In one sense, Weisberg's version is not so different from that
of a studied feminist like Carol Rose. Each tells the story of law
and literature from her own perspective. Rose, in her wonder-
fully earthy and intellectual Property as Storytelling,46 depicts
narrative theory primarily through women like Robin West.
She does not refer to White. Weisberg leans heavily on Cardozo.
Although Weisberg attributes to one very powerful essay by
Cardozo a greater role in law and literature than other commen-
tators have,47 the emphasis is a notable addition, as the passages
he cites show Cardozo's self-consciousness about the force of
words that augments his remarkably crafted judicial opinions.48
Only later does a rereading of Weisberg reveal that he once
would have told the story differently. Though his Preface has
identified White---"whose early efforts helped to establish the
field of Law and Literature" 49-- it is to foretell his report that
White has sadly not "fulfilled his promise."50 In his history and
"strategies" of law and literature from page one to the end of the
book, 51 he never mentions White until he begins the eulogy. He
omits, in the Preface, why Law and Literature's identification as
a vital area of the intellectual landscape arose "more than fifteen
years" 52 ago, as well as the name of the only book on the subject
in the 1970s. The missing marker is the publication of James
Boyd White's The Legal Imagination in 1973.53 Even Susan
Mann, highly critical of White, identifies White as the "founder
of the Law and Literature movement," citing Richard Posner,
no fan of White's or the field's, for authority. 4 Rose, in choos-
ing to omit mention of White, turns the male obliviousness to
the feminine writers back on the men; how is Weisberg turning,
45. d at 10.
46. Carol Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory and Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990).
47. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 6-7.
48. Id
49. Id. at xiv.
50. Id.
51. Id. passim.
52. Id at xiv.
53. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).




when he does not mention White except to report on his demise
at the end of Poethics?
I note that I think Rose a tad misguided. West's very title
for her Economic Man and Literary Woman '5 reveals that the
space White inhabited in 1973 was taboo, feminine, nonanalytic,
heretical, at best marginal. Only his extensive learning, his
nearly perfect scholarship 56 combining with what might have
otherwise been "unacceptable" passion (and even a poetic cast)
in his writing, cleared the way for literature in law. The influx of
women into that now familiar topography attests to the very
courage and singularity of White's initial work. He ventured
where words had lost meaning, and that is why my perplexity at
his avoidance of feminine work is secondary to my respect and
admiration.
After rewriting the story to erase White, when Weisberg
reaches the end of the book to pronounce judgment, what is his
report? From what I can glean, Weisberg claims that White's
rhetoric overcomes White's morality, honesty, and perhaps
more.5 7 "Rhetoric" for Weisberg means craft without commit-
ment, without ethical content. Dutifully noting that White him-
self resists theory and embraces uncertainty, that White portrays
his own writing as involving a nonlinear double movement that
eludes analysis, Weisberg then tries to analyze White. As he
does it, I fail to find any consistent theme except one, which I
will suggest both second-guesses White in a dangerous way and
threatens the very enterprise Weisberg endorses.
Weisberg may of course judge White's writings-that
would follow from Weisberg's notion of poetic correctness
(which he contrasts to White's "complex rhetoric")58 as the true
aspiration of law and its related literature. Weisberg fails to see
any literary quality in White's text. The "fluid harmony" Weis-
berg says is elemental to poethics, he transmutes in his portrait
of White into something "slippery. '5 9 He finds that White's
writing and its ideas give forth "a sensuous blast of coercion (the
55. Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L.
REv. 867 (1988).
56. Weisberg does not follow suit. For example, the review entitled Translation as
Argument, which Weisberg attributes to David Trubeck, was written by Mark Tushnet.
WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 254 n.10; see Mark V. Tushnet, Translation as Argument, 32
WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 105 (1990) (book review).
57. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 240.
58. Id, at 225.
59. See, e.g., id at 244-45.
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sound-sense 'force' pervades)." 6 But the problem with this dire
diagnosis is that it is accompanied by a theoretic that conflicts
with itself. The force comes from "so much inconsistency" 61 in
which White "struggle[s] to engage the honest, but ... always
yields to the artful. ' 62 Recall that "honesty" is now for Weis-
berg's venture a poetic term, perhaps even a vehicle of discern-
ment of human authenticity. When White "utterly fails," 63 he is
not just writing an inadequate book, under Weisberg's analysis.
Yet White's "yielding to the artful" may be the very heart
of poethics, its fulfillment and not its betrayal. If White accepts
the draw of the artful, then by poethics standards, he fulfills the
hope of art if what he writes is beautiful. Then he has not cho-
sen artfulness in vain, because good art is true. That from one
vantage is "all ye know on earth and all ye need to know.' 64
Even White's critics, including Weisberg and Levinson, call his
work inspiring.
Weisberg's dilemma of truth and beauty repeats itself in his
text. He rails that White fails to give an independent answer to
ethical questions, within Weisberg's own book that posits the
fusion of form and substance. The ethical sounds in the
resonance of the text, Weisberg has said, not in propositional
logic. How can Weisberg stand outside his own text, to call
White a failure for standing within his? Weisberg claims that
White will not give a definitive rule for those elusive "values"
that will keep us from evil, but rather returns within his texts,
"double-edged, slippery, pleasing to the ear of the authority
whose translation ultimately is the only one that counts.
'6-
60. Id. at 247.
61. Yet Weisberg has acknowledged the constitutive "inconsistency" of paradoxical,
poetic "logic" and has praised White for his consistency. Id. at 301, 303.
62. Id. at 246.
63. Id. at 249.
64. JOHN KEATS, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in THE ODES OF KEATS AND THEIR EARLI-
EST KNOWN MANUSCRIPTS (Robert Gittings ed., 1970). This I would suggest also
involves the realm of the spirit; for the necessary relationship among truth, beauty, and the
good in a religious context, see WEIL, supra note 10; see also PETER WINCH, SIMONE
WEIL: "THE JUST BALANCE" (1989) (a strong commentary on Weil's Waiting for God);
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Religious and Poetical Speaking, in MYTH, SYMBOL AND REALITY
86 (Alan M. Olson ed., 1980). Marie Ashe's expression of resistance to Weil so echoes my
own that I need to note it: to read Weil, I have to imagine that she could have done what
she did in a solidarity of love that seems beyond my ken much of the time. It is not
impossible that she was led to eat only what those she knew to be suffering in the Holocaust
had as daily rations, even when it led to her own death, but my concern for the feminine
temptation to "rush to crucifixion" makes me very wary.
65. WEISBERG, supra note I, at 247.
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Which authority does Weisberg claim is ultimate for White?
The judge in one hearing? The next court? The Supreme Court?
Harvard Law Review? The one who keeps White in "that" place
in the academic hierarchy? White and only White? My vote for
White's authority "figure" is for the kind of authority his col-
league Joseph Vining alludes to in The Authoritative and the
Authoritarian,66 the one that is most likely to do what I take
Weisberg to want most of all: lead us not to recommit the Holo-
caust. Vining's authority is "figurative" in the most important
sense.67 And where I see White voyaging is closer to the abyss
that must be traversed to find the Other than where Weisberg
dares. Weisberg's book is full of the cry to make visible the lines
of ethical action which will assure that we do not replicate Vichy
France-that cry is eloquent but, as he himself says in contrast-
ing himself to Cardozo, 6S pessimistic.
In part, that is necessary pessimism, because even if we see
the lines, nothing can guarantee that we will not cross them.
Free will always leaves radical uncertainty. For the very reason
of that uncertainty, that riskiness, here I call to White, for it is in
Weisberg's cry that I find the note of conversation missing in the
mesmerizing final chapters of Justice As Translation. I cannot
begin to suggest how that cry might resound in White's text, but
there is a gritty reality to Weisberg's tenacious desire for norms
or assurances, and the answer to that call on us has, I think,
come to its time.
My own nascent attempts to deal with such an incalculable
historical reality arose from actual encounters with Jews who
cared enough to say that they understood in their heads that
Christians might genuinely love them as persons, but they did
not believe it in their hearts. One such Jew was the rabbi of
66. JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986); see
also Joseph Vining, Law and Enchantment: The Place of Belief, 86 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1987).
67. Vining suggests that law and theology are about the same project. VINING, supra
note 66. I would like to think that his theological figure is more akin to the suffering
servant than God The Father, but Vining, too, is elusive. Both White and Vining, in virtu-
ally ignoring actual female writers, are almost reminiscent of the strange misogyny (strange
because Derrida also suggests a crypto-feminism in, of all writers, Nietzsche) of those who
seem to write for the Eternal Feminine but avoid writing of or to real women. See Jacques
Derrida, Otobiographies, in THE EAR OF THE OTHER (Christie McDonald trans., 1985). In
addition see Christopher Norris's lucid interpretation in CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA
199-208 (1987).
68. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 237.
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whom I have written69 who, when he gave me a plain wooden
cross from Bethlehem the last time I saw him, made me promise
not to analyze it. Illuminating the gift of it, which I cannot pos-
sibly analyze, was his sharing with me some of the hate mail that
he would receive simply because he was a rabbi. I have no ade-
quate way of conveying (or knowing) fully what that meant to
me in terms of trust and love, but I believe I recognize some
resonance, some same-melody of it, in genuine interfaith
encounters. And the final two chapters of White's book begin to
portray for me both the risk of the abyss so insistent in Derrida
and the interfaith space that theologians like David Tracy of my
tradition,70 and David Novak of Weisberg's tradition,7 I convey.
No wonder White cannot give Weisberg the theory he demands;
in Novak's tradition, we are not even to name The Name,
HaShem, as if we could understand much less explain The
Name.
In one strand of Weisberg's tradition, it is the very spaces
between the lines and letters that allow the new to become visi-
ble within the text. The filling of those spaces72 is midrash, the
textual commentary that completes the name of God, in which
the scriptures and their revisioning together will finally become
one uninterrupted word. Thus to dare comment, to word walk
into the unknown, is to contribute to the completion of creation
and to tikkun olam, the healing of the world. Weisberg asks in
essence, what will guarantee that such moves into the indefinable
will be ethical? Although I take White to affirm something not
unlike my own trust of mystery when he says "one is always at
the edge of what can be done; .. .beyond it is something
unknown and if only for that reason wonderful, '73 Weisberg
seems to miss the clues in this mystery story. They are like the
purloined letter, in plain sight and visible to those who have eyes
to see. They are at once ordinary and hidden. One foundational
telltale of their presence, Weisberg mentions but does not seem
69. Emily Fowler Hartigan, The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as Invita-
tion, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67 (1991); Emily Fowler Hartigan, Parabolic Jokes and
the Unknown Law, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 73 (1991).
70. See DAVID TRACY, DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER: THE INTER-RELIGIOUS DIA-
LOGUE (1990).
71. See DAVID NOVAK, JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE: A JEWISH JUSTIFICATION
(1989).
72. Never leaving the text saturated, however-space is always in abundance.
73. WHITE, supra note 2, at 253.
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yet to trust-beauty. What makes a poem true in the sense that
he touches on in his admiration of Cardozo, is its integral
beauty.
The cost of such beauty is life given freely in trust. That
incalculable equation of beauty and trust is seen in The Book of
Job ,' as Stephen Mitchell translates and introduces it, and in
the atfirmation of life that Jewish women are making now more
than ever, finally in letters and about law.75 The reality that life
is conversation is nowhere more evident than in the Christian
attendance on the Jewish announcement of new life, an
announcement I hear in both Jewish feminism and the renewal
of Jewish mysticism.76 (This fidelity has been there all along,
quietly in what Jewish law expert David Bleich, Weisberg's col-
league at Cardozo, calls the "nuts and bolts" of halacha,7 in
those strands of Judaism that have not ever taken the death of
God so literally as have some of us.) There is no shortcut
through the night that a true journeying-with requires, but the
millennial truth of Job speaks of a profundity of the human con-
dition that makes the physical, emotional, and spiritual terror of
the Holocaust all too available to every person alive. Once, I
would not have presumed to call to any Jew to affirm that the
Holocaust be risked, but it is the very fidelity of Jews who have
taught me, which allows this call to arise in community. Thus,
because of the dispensation in which Jews have given permission
for the Easter Alleluia78 we can all celebrate what Stephen
Mitchell draws from Job's story.
For Mitchell, Job's narrative becomes a poem, and a radi-
cally beautiful one. He tells a story, which his first sentence
identifies as containing "[o]ne of the milder paradoxes that shape
this greatest Jewish work of art ... [in] that its hero is a Gen-
74. See Stephen Mitchell, Introduction to THE BOOK OF JOB, supra note 39.
75. See generally VANESSA L. OCHS, WORDS ON FIRE: ONE WOMAN'S JOURNEY
INTO THE SACRED (1990); JUDITH PLASKOW, STANDING AGAIN AT SINAI: JUDAISM
FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE (1990).
76. See supra note 75; see also HAROLD BLOOM, KABBALAH AND CRITICISM (1983);
LAWRENCE KUSHNER, GOD WAS IN THIS PLACE AND I, I DID NOT KNOW (1991);
GERSHON G. SCHOLEM, MAJOR TRENDS IN JEWISH MYSTICISM (1946); YOUR WORD Is
FIRE (Arthur Green & Barry W. Holtz eds. & trans., 1977).
77. Conversation with David Bleich, Herbert & Forence Tenzer Professor of Jewish
Law & Ethics, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
78. See NICHOLAS LASH, EASTER IN ORDINARY: REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN EXPE-
RIENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 211 (1988); Hartigan, The Power of Language
Beyond Words: Law as Invitation, supra note 69, at 105-12; see also CAROL OCHS, THE
NOAH PARADOX: TIME AS BURDEN, TIME AS BLESSING (1991).
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tile."' 79 It is Job's innocence that makes the story of urgent spiri-
tual significance in this post-Holocaust age, Mitchell begins. Yet
the Job he portrays is not the patient Job of the Greek scripture
but a ferocious, mouthy, raging Job, who will not give up his
demand for an answer to why he must suffer without reason.
My flesh blackens and peels;
all my bones are on fire.
And my harp is tuned to mourning,
my flute to the sound of tears.8 0
Job calls God to account:
But what good has virtue done me?
How has God rewarded me?
Isn't disgrace for sinners
and misery for the wicked?
Can't he tell right from wrong
or keep his accounts in order?"1
The answer comes from the Unnamable, and it is an answer
of images "so intense that, as Job later acknowledges, he doesn't
hear but sees the Voice."'8 2 Mitchell tells us that Job's final
words of outrage come to not submission but surrender, because
the answer is an encounter with God's Voice imaging the world
in a way that transforms Job.83 The movement through Job is
one from talk of justification to a new experience that remains
awe-filling, mysterious, ironic-and brings names to Job's
daughters. The movement, Mitchell says, is "from righteousness
to beauty."' 4
What sort of cry of outrage would bring such a meeting
with the Unnamable? It is the cry of innocence suffering. At
some point, that cry must be both our own and on behalf of the
Other. What comes to mind for me is Howard Lesnick's dia-
logue between (standard) Legal Education and a Critic (a ver-
sion of Lesnick's own voice) in facing the chemical disaster at
the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India in 1984. The Critic
finds the detached, rational, utility-calculating face of justice
that Legal Education paints, "an unbearingly repellent carica-
79. Mitchell, supra note 74, at vii.
80. THE BOOK OF JOB, supra note 39, at 73.
81. Id.
82. Mitchell, supra note 74, at xx.
83. Id. at xxvii; see THE BOOK OF JOB, supra note 39, at 91.
84. Mitchell, supra note 74, at xxx (emphasis added).
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ture.' '1 5 He states his reactions to the horror:
My first reaction is to cry.... I imagine myself carrying my
two-year-old daughter, stumbling to find someone safe and
expert enough to treat her, or hurrying to deliver her body to
an improvised communal pyre before she becomes a source, not
of pleasure and pride, but of cholera. She is beautiful, precious,
and innocent .... 6
His second reaction is to pray. The wonderfully unpredictable
prayer of this Jew with strong Quaker tendencies is this:
Holy Mary, Mother of God
Pray for us now
And at the hour of our death.
Amen.
7
Third, he wants to scream; fourth, he wants to do something -
and, fifth, he wants to despair.88 This is an irresistible testament
of compassion, touching all the strands of Job's story (except
perhaps Lesnick's direct address to God of his own innocence).
In the wake of a tangibly personal and passionate response
(that two-year-old is a real person in Lesnick's life), Lesnick
chides Legal Education for wanting "an answer" to the question
of the place of human responses in legal thought. "The finding
is in the search, in a continually deepening unfolding of under-
standing. '8 9 The alternative to this search is the counsel of cos-
mic despair, which Lesnick refuses. Key to his refusal is a level
of reflection that he has elsewhere called "radical"-yet his use
of the term is not what the reader might expect.90 Lesnick
chooses, to sound out his commitment as political actor, the
realm not of "secular manifestations of a radical perspective" '91
but rather the realm of the spiritual-because he finds religious
thought "more often... committed to combining an uncompro-
mising sense of injustice with a refusal to let compassion be sub-
merged by anger."' 92  The resilience of compassion is the
85. Howard Lesnick, Legal Education's Concern with Justice: A Conversation with a
Critic, 35 J. LEGAL EDuC. 414, 415 (1985).
86. Id. at 416.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 416-17.
89. Id. at 419.
90. Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective
on Perspectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 413, 431-39. A number of my Jurisprudence students
found themselves muttering "but I can't be a radical; they throw bombs and stuff" after
identifying with his rendition of political stances.




hallmark of the spirit, and that movement beyond rage is the
way in which the Voice can become palpable reality for Job.
Within White's writing, there are often times which touch
the kind of pain that enrages--even Weisberg cites the sensitiv-
ity of White's impassioned analysis of Dred Scott, which Weis-
berg aspires to parallel in his Vichy commentary. But after
reading Lesnick's imagined response to Bhopal, or Patricia Wil-
liams's narrative of her sojourns as a black woman in the world
of law, or Marie Ashe's profoundly textured reproductive sto-
ries, 9 3 some of the direct narrative offerings from White ring
faintly at best. Although there is no "objective" vantage from
which to evaluate the stakes of White's attempts to create
mutual translation with his son's Latin American "host" family,
the account lacks the tragic moments on which true life transla-
tion must hinge. Even the reported times of "failure and frustra-
tion" are "cheerfully tolerated. ' 94 The exemplar belies the
message of the surrounding text, which names a venture both
promising and truly dangerous.95 The terrain that law maps is
lethal, literally and figuratively, as well as life-giving.
Weisberg's section on Vichy shows a face of death that
Weisberg can claim to mirror in his person. 96 The visage of
human brokenness is an unavoidable face of the law, of transla-
tion, of justice.97 We cannot see that countenance directly in
White's text; in contrast, Patricia Williams has created and rec-
ognized her "round brown face" in the glass of Bennetton's
unyielding door, letting us see in that reflection the deathmask of
racism. I made an assumption after I first met James Boyd
White that I think his writing may justify: that his life has con-
tained pain comparable (if pain were subject to comparison) to
that of Patricia Williams.98 The difference is that she makes hers
93. Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduc-
tion" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REv. 355 (1989); WILLIAMS, supra note 7.
94. WHITE, supra note 2, at 232-33.
95. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
96. This is the thesis of communal salvation in MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD, THE BODY
OF FAITH: JUDAISM AS CORPOREAL ELECTION (1983); the possible implications are per-
haps open and infinite.
97. Jacques Derrida, The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration, in
FOR NELSON MANDELA 11 (Jacques Derrida & Mustapha Tlili eds., Mary A. Cans &
Isabelle Lorenz trans., 1987).
98. This may be in some ways a truism about any sensitive human being. Any fur-
ther disclosure of its verity is up to White, to whom I have sent the drafts of this essay; he
has assured me that I have not invaded his sense of privacy.
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clearly manifest in her writing.99 Similarly, Marie Ashe, Ruth
Colker, and Andrew McTheniao° write texts in which their own
fear, pain, need-the vulnerable side of their texts' personal
groundings-are to varying degrees visible along with their aspi-
rations and joys. That fuller disclosure springs from a remarka-
ble courage, and like Job's self-revelation't0 may be necessary to
the full import of any attempt, in dialogue about law, at a resolu-
tion of death-against-life.
White in one sense moves constantly towards unsettling any
final resolution, but eludes fuller opening to a story or dialogue
that might make his gestures towards the unknown more trust-
worthy for the legal reader. However, the lack does not make
his pointing to mystery coercive-as Weisberg"0 2 and Mark
Tushnet10 3 seem to charge-except to the extent that there is
something "compelling" about the Good. This sense of the force
of the word, of a poem, unlike the coercion with which Weisberg
labels White, is suggested by the literary scholar Harold Bloom.
In his book Kabbalah And Criticism,1°4 Bloom portrays the
effect of "strong poetry" on the reader: the response evoked
"insist[s] upon itself . . . it and the text are one."10' 5 This
intensely personal response comes from the true power of the
written words.
The yielding to the Word is the movement of surrender
Mitchell has attributed to Job, a surrender that opens to the
Unnamable's overwhelming presence. "It is not enough for him
to hope or believe or know that there is absolute justice in the
universe: he must taste and see it.' 10 6 Mitchell's revivifying
turn on the standard translations of the final response to the
99. Kathryn Abrams calls such disclosure "first person agony narratives." Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 1021 (1991).
100. See Ashe, supra note 93; Ruth Colker, The Female Body and the Law: On Truth
and Lies, 99 YALE L.J. 1159 (1990); Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321
(1991); Andrew W. MeThenia Jr., Telling a Story About Storytelling, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC.
67 (1990).
101. Which opens most fundamentally, contrary to his friends' counsel, to his inno-
cence-a turn that makes his story a parable of the Promise. THE BOOK OF JOB, supra note
39, at 8.
102. WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 247.
103. Tushnet, supra note 56.
104. See BLOOM, supra note 77.
105. This construction of Bloom comes from KUSHNER, supra note 77. After read-
ing Bloom myself, I decided to retain Kushner's misreading of Bloom, because it seems
poetic justice.
106. Mitchell, supra note 74, at xxvii.
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Unnamable by Job, is that Job was "comforted" to be dust.10 7
That dust is the warm, soft stuff of human habitation in the
world, a world the Unnamable has just made indelibly present as
gift. It is also the ordinariness of the world after the suffering of
all loss-in its new incarnation, the human is both humbled and
exalted. Risking such new life is an affirmation that requires
risking "once again." The resistance to that, the "never again,"
is beyond our ken. In Cinders, Jacques Derrida writes of the all-
burning, the Holocaust, and the resistance to turning anew:
"There is rebellion against the Phoenix and also the affirmation
of the fire without place or mourning."108 Finally, now and yet
as it always has been and will be, he confesses that "the innu-
merable lurks beneath the cinder. Incubation of the fire lurking
beneath the dust."'1 9
As Denise Levertov suggests, Hunting the Phoenix goes
beyond texts in the simple sense:
Leaf through discolored manuscripts,
make sure no words
lie thirsting, bleeding,
waiting for rescue. No:
old loves half-
articulated, moments forced
out of the stream of perception
to play 'statue',
and never released-
they had no blood to shed.
You must seek
the ashy nest itself
if you hope to find
charred feathers, smouldering flightbones,
and a twist of singing flame
rekindling. 1 '
If White wants Weisberg and his people to risk new life
with him in a community based on shared talk, then he will per-
haps have to consider disclosing more of his experience of the
rending of life's wholeness as it has touched him directly, or his
encounter with Weisberg's "difference." If Weisberg wants
White to be more forthcoming, somehow more "honest," he will
have to consider perhaps writing with more fidelity to his prede-
107. Id. at xxviii.
108. JACQUEs DERRIDA, CINDERS 59 (Ned Lukacher ed. & trans., 1991).
109. Id.
110. DENISE LEVERTOV, BREATHING THE WATER 4 (1984).
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cessors and to the chance of beauty. To read White's texts is to
be called toward life-even Tushnet names one of the final two
chapters of Justice as Translation as "extremely striking""' -
because they are so often simply beautiful. But Weisberg
reminds us of the exacting standard that history makes unavoid-
able-the beauty is terrible indeed. White has written: "To tell
a story that ends in total failure is simply not endurable."
1 1 2
Weisberg does not want, it seems, to risk that the Holocaust is
replicable or beyond redemption by a learned ethic. If White is
to write with sufficient tensile strength to draw even Weisberg
into his story, he may have to risk telling the reader what an
unendurable story might sound like to him, or has sounded like
in his life.
In my tradition, that story is what the disciples of Jesus
experienced: to have recognized God's love in the world, and to
see it, from their perspectives, finally defeated.11 3 The resurrec-
tion came as a truly unbelievable story-the women conveyed it
in confusion and the men refused it repeatedly. Yet the story is
in a sense one any person may relate once she accepts that only
by dying can we live anew. It is in Hebrew scripture the story of
the suffering servant. The translator of the Yawehist strand of
Hebrew scripture for Harold Bloom's The Book of J, David
Rosenberg, makes a stunning translation of the Isaiah passages
of the suffering servant. 1 4 In A Poet's Bible, he breaks voice
only once that I can detect: as he translates contemporary
images of the suffering Jews in the Holocaust directly into
Isaiah, then shifts to first person, turning the story to the tradi-
tion of the "guilty," to Christianity:
my own people were blind
but his eyes were true
suffering the world for them. 5
The victim of the Holocaust and the story of the figure who sup-
posedly "dominated" the culture of the perpetrators for two mil-
lennia, move into one another. This is the image in Marc
Chagall's "White Crucifixion," of Jeshu on the cross wrapped in
a prayer shawl, surrounded by images of modern persecution of
111. Tushnet, supra note 56, at 105.
112. WHITE, supra note 14, at 171.
113. See SEBASTIAN MOORE, LET THIS MIND BE IN You: THE QUEST FOR IDEN-
TITY THROUGH OEDIPUS TO CHRIST (1985) (on the experience of the disciples).
114. THE BOOK OF J (Harold Bloom ed., David Rosenberg trans., 1988).
115. DAVID ROSENBERG, A POET'S BIBLE 286 (1991).
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Jews. This is the turn to the terrible beauty of the truly human
children of God, the beauty sufficient to move God the Father
(and the Mother) to let the children go free, free to hurt and be
hurt, free to love and trust. It would be truly intolerable if we
could not risk the freedom to learn to trust one another and thus
to foster the "interactive life" and the "creation of something
new" that White so values.116 Never to risk would be final
defeat, and unspeakably ugly.
Yet the resistances to this risk must be fully lived. Weis-
berg wants ethical norms, or some other ground of trust, from
White. And Levinson and I hope for something more conversa-
tional, more mutual, from White. Levinson calls White's work
monologue. 1 7 That charge touches my sense of the paternal in
White's text. Even Lesnick falls into the distancing mode that
White shares-the pain they report is that of a father. Part of
the suffering servant is his willingness to suffer on behalf of
others, but an integral part is the experience of suffering, of tast-
ing personal pain, abandonment and even despair. White
touches this when he talks of the translator as living on the mar-
gins,"" and suggests the tensions so created, but he shows
neither the pain nor the recognition that perhaps we are all
translators at the margin and are all incalculably different. He
also reveals in the stance of his translator the risk to the very
"multivocity" he advocates: the translator is one "who wishes
to connect two worlds, two ways of being and seeing, in his own
mind, in his own perceptions and feelings."'1 9 The translator
"does all the voices" in his voice.'
20
White's later recognition in Justice as Translation both that
the other is always "imperfectly knowable," and that texts will
be inadequate in "the representation of another,"121 is not suffi-
cient for me as a woman, to relieve my sense of being potentially
(unconsciously?) subsumed into his sense of the human, so long
as those of my voice are absent from his texts. How am I to
trust that he recognizes there are "different" human voices that
116. WHITE, supra note 2, at 257-62.
117. Levinson, supra note 17, at 1875-76.
118. WHITE, supra note 2, at 231.
119. Id.
120. Yet he names an aspect implicit in this move: "It is in fact the radical intellec-
tual vice of our day to insist that everything be translated into one's own terms." Id. at
259.
121. Id. at 258.
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he will never fully understand (as I will never fully understand
his) and that is not a tragedy but an invitation?
In the absence, in White's text, of women as conversation
partners, contemporary text writers, or concrete subjects, my
resistance to his translating me or to his addressing me as reader
in the attempt at open texture that Chapter Eleven illustrates
wonderfully, might be softened if I saw a greater openness in his
writing. His text is guarded, and I as reader cannot open as fully
to it as I would had he told me his story as Marie Ashe or
Andrew McThenia have, or turned his brilliant reading toward
texts of "difference" that he can engage but never fully compre-
hend. Katherine Anne Porter's Noon Wine,122 a rare, perhaps
lone contemporary feminine story in his lexicon, is seen only
through the male characters. White's talk of the miracle of the
creativity of the word between people is always one level of
abstraction too removed: I see only a doubly-reflected, occa-
sional feminine or "different" figure. How can I as a woman
reader know that he even suspects that he cannot speak for me?
Those of other "differences" might ask their own versions of my
question. 123
My concern with White's confirmation of a mode of dis-
course challenged by postmoderns-one in which he does not
acknowledge that his own voice is one among many, yet by the
momentum of intellectual history continues to be seen as "pre-
tending" to the throne of "humanism"-has two aspects. One is
the impaired value of his text because of its paradoxically self-
circumscribed, unselfconscious limitation to the male dance;
124
the other relates to the wasteful side of attacks on the patriarchy.
To follow White's increasingly angry critics in either discounting
his writing or accusing him of being unethical, would be a ver-
sion of the flaw of theories of social determinism that all social
commentary risks. It would reduce White to his role in the aca-
demic hierarchy, and deny his personhood by refusing to listen
for his own story. Such reduction threatens all who exercise
power. In public power terms, the refutation of such reduction-
122. KATHERINE ANNE PORTER, NOON WINE (1937).
123. This commentary applies to Weisberg. He says nice things about how gentle
and influential Robin West is in footnotes, see WEISBERG, supra note 1, at 268 n.26, but he
gives her even less serious textual space than White did at the AALS Jurisprudence work-
shop, where White cited her activity as parallel to his own. Weisberg has, however, made
room for TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (1990) in his course. See, eg., WEISBERG,
supra note 1, at 34.
124. Always with the delightful anomaly of Jane Austen.
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ism lies in the conundrum of Marxism: if each person's con-
sciousness is in part determined by social relations (economic for
Marx, linguistic for White) then, to that extent, not only are the
oppressed innocent, but so are the powerful.
At this point I venture a step into the abyss. There is an
eerie emerging symmetry to this risk of power. In the public
realm, men have patriarchal power. In the private, women have
what has been called "the power behind the throne." Male col-
leagues have repeatedly answered tough questions about their
carelessness of women in the academy with this defense: women
really run things anyway. Perhaps men need to articulate their
equivalents of women's fears of domination and abuse that
Robin West and her cohorts voice. Women have no public
selves in West's summary of the argument. 12 The correlative
stories would tell of men's fears and narratives of domination
and abuse in the realm in which they fear invisibility: the "pri-
vate" and the moral. The value of such stories would be, for me,
the aspiration to bring to consciousness the things that women
do that men experience much (but not the same) as women have
experienced violation and domination. These stories might help
us not to do to men an inverse version of what they have done to
us (with our participation) and a new, more complex public-pri-
vate polarity might allow women to "go public" and men to "go
private," more creatively.
One alternative to such a redemption of human powers is
the hatred of law at the core of Chesterton's story of anarchism
and paradox in The Man Who Was Thursday.1 26 In the begin-
ning, Syme a police officer who calls himself a poet of the law,
meets the mysterious, charismatic anarchist Gregory (and his
lovely sister Rosamund). Through an unpredictably
postmodern set of inversion-after-inversions, the secret organiza-
tion of anarchists turns out to be populated by seven day-persons
who have lives in the law by day, and infiltrate-and are genu-
inely caught up in-the anarchist conspiracy by night. As the
story moves to denouement, each of the weekdays (Syme is
Thursday) reveals aspects of human character, and all focus on
the leader, Sunday. Chesterton's allegory is in the end religious,
as Sunday is God's peace, the Christian Sabbath ordained and
sustained by law. He is, however, as tantalizingly inexplicable as
125. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
126. CHESTERTON, supra note 12.
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a God in a world where innocence suffers must be-there is no
resolution of theodicy here. Yet the story does two things key to
my discussion of conversation. First, it suggests why suffering is
important to a true story, and, second, it illustrates why the suf-
fering here as explicitly primary, may be masculine theology.
The need to give some, though never fully satisfactory,
account of suffering and violence in law, comes to crisis in the
one remaining unconverted anarchist-Gregory, who has no
day. Gregory is a chaotic figure, whose fate the book does not
reveal. His resistance to Sunday is finally met-after he accuses
Sunday of being in power, and vows resistance to all law because
those in power cause pain but have not suffered.127 I hear echoes
of this accusation in Weisberg's and Mann's accounts of White;
they experience White as impervious, oblivious, domineering.
Those who know they have been dominated find it hard to call
to mind that everyone has a story, and every story has pain.
Robert Cover says that the power-wielder in the law is not in the
same universe of discourse as the one against whom the force of
law is used.128 He is right, but that is not all the story. It is also
true that we are all subject to the law.
Sunday's answer to Gregory is the unimaginable power of
suffering when it is done in love. In an image tapping the Chris-
tian mystery of the suffering of the Father in the Son, Sunday
looms into awe-inspiring vastness and depth, departing with
"have you ever suffered?" 
129
Yet Chesterton's final question carries a tone of rhetorical
accusation-when the true wonder is that the suffering servant
does it for love. This is the second contribution of Chesterton's
story to mine: he illustrates the masculine primacy of suffering.
Perhaps that is what the spiritual must be at this time in history
for the masculine-it must focus on letting go, on giving up
power. As many women theologians have suggested, women
need a different spirituality-one of claiming and naming, of
active manifestation of self. The feminine must become publicly
visible.
Chesterton does the predictable with his just visible femi-
nine figure: The book ends with Syme catching sight of Greg-
127. CHESTERTON, supra note 12, at 189-91.
128. See Cover, supra note 95.
129. CHESTERTON, supra note 12, at 191. We are not told if this answer overcomes




ory's sister. The eternal feminine is spotted. Note that the
entire story, between the first few pages and the very last, takes
place without her acknowledged presence. The men go on their
quest, dancing with men before a masculine God, and return
finally able to see that the woman exists, but no more.
I would suggest that it is here that the conversation starts.
Men have a story of sonship. Women need both to tell a story of
daughtership, which I find in Mary of Bethany, but that is
another story, and somehow to allow men the space in the "pri-
vate," the personal, which the power of feminine emotion has
circumscribed. That is, I propose that the world Jean Bethke
Elshtain calls Public Man, Private Woman 130 was one in which
men too, have suffered domination, but have not told us how.
Just as patriarchs may be innocent for their unconscious deeds,
but may move to take responsibility and turn toward mutuality,
so women may be innocent of maternal moralistic domination,
and can perhaps only move toward mutuality if we are told the
effects of what we have unintentionally done. Women must hear
men's experiences of pain to understand their own power-so we
may be more careful of it, open it to the Other, share in it in
conscious love.
The need for men's personal narratives is part of why Weis-
berg's story of pain is valuable in its relentlessness, although it
would be more fruitful if it did not come with accusations of
moral inauthenticity. In part, it is because of this need, and
because I do not believe White could write such eloquent texts
that strain at the boundaries were he not living the costly life of
aspiring to careful consciousness and to justice, that I call him to
conversation. The final account of law in Chesterton is of the
power of the suffering of life in love, in which even the creator
participates. It is the power of powerlessness, and it allows true
conversation among equals.
What Chesterton suggests through his voiceless feminine
figure, I propose explicitly: The relationship to the goodness and
the beauty of law and justice requires pain but means love.13 1
And the Other is necessary to love.
130. JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN (1981).
131. This learns from Julian of Norwich's "showing" that Jesus's meaning was love.
2 A BOOK OF SHOWINGS TO THE ANCHORESS JULIAN OF NORWICH 733 (Edmund Col-




The use of the dated canon restricts both Weisberg and
White, but given White's valuation of newness and his greater
profundity, it is most poignant in his case. No longer limited to
addressing the Ideal Reader, the learned, Western, Christian
white male author now has actual Others, capable of their own
voices, with whom to do not even the striking theoretical dance
White envisions, but more-the real dance. This dance-between
is an invitation to truly radical re-vision, and not even James
Boyd White can (or need) do it alone. Such choreographies do
not require abandonment of the canon, but rather invite us to
untold abundance in new perspectives on both old and new.
One splendid version of the presence of the Other in a male text
is the series of portraits of legal actors that Milner Ball illumi-
nates in The Word and the Law.1 32 He spends time and conver-
sation with a series of people who work with the law. The
"objects" of his narration are women, Jews, people of color,
whom he conveys to the reader through a rich tension between
his appreciation of their true differences, and his love and respect
for each of these Others. Those of obvious marginality 33 appear
in Ball's texts as beloved subjects from time to time because he
so often uses their own words.
In almost painful contrast, we do not hear of such meeting
in White's text1 34; there seems instead an excruciating tension
between desired conversation and actual monologue.
Imagine for the moment that I am speaking to you not in writ-
ing but face-to-face, and that, in an effort to make a new start, I
say: "I want to talk to you next about justice and translation."
So I want to begin. But what kind of sentence is that? It
makes "justice" and "translation" nouns, or nomens, as
if there were entities in the world that could be named-
pointed out and referred to-by these words, which of
course there are not .... "There is the world of talk, and
the world beyond talk," I seem to say; the relation
between them is that the first is "about" the other. But
translation is a form of talk....
And I say "I" and "you" with great assurance, as though
132. MILNER BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (forthcoming 1993).
133. As opposed to the hidden vulnerabilities of a white male as suffering subject at
(White) or near (Ball, on the ascent) the top of the academic hierarchy.
134. In Weisberg's we hear of academic jousting. See, e.g., WEISBERG, supra note 1,
at 188-250. I find it hard to read Posner, Weisberg's most frequent interlocutor, as Levin-
son does, that is, as involved in the genuine risks of human conversation. See Sanford
Levinson, Strolling down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical Legal Studies?): The
Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221 (1991).
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there were one "me," who "wants to talk," and one
"you," who is expected to-to do what? "listen?"
"receive?" "understand?" Or simply do nothing, not to
be there in the discourse at all? (Does my talking imply
no correlative activity on your part?) ....
. . . "Justice" and "translation" are not labels but words,
and they must receive much of their meaning from the
text I make in talking to you, and in your response to it.
They are references to the past and a promise for the
future. 135
The quality of White's text is, as Levinson suggests, clearly pas-
sionate, sensitive, profound, subtle, wonderfully reflective. But
the very goodness of its particularity and partiality, necessary in
some measure because the author is not the Author but only one
person, is muffled in the offering of White's inner processes that
leaves key dimensions and figures in his internal conversation
veiled. Nor has the larger "text" expanded beyond the reader's
one response-White never answers Levinson.
The relation of the hidden and the open is inherent in the
mystery of these things, however, and the beauty of White's pro-
cess is still unmistakable. I am reminded of Allan Hutchinson's
critique of Martha Minow's allegedly "relational" approach,
when she never moves out of the univocal authority of the com-
mentator. 136 Hutchinson vouches for her personal presence as
attractive, though we never apprehend it directly in her text.
137 I
found my first response to Justice as Translation, read after that
first meeting with White, was sadness that the reader did not get
to encounter the genuine, remarkable person whom I had met.
If that is the source of Weisberg's "frustration," then Weisberg
is in a way right: there is more to James Boyd White than the
reader is shown. But this is not dishonesty. It is a face of
human limitation as constitutive of human wholeness in the
world. Resistance to deeper choice for disclosure, for fuller
encounter with the reader, for conversation with others or space
in the text for the Other's voice, is, with Weisberg's further
resistance to trusting beauty rather than righteousness, to be
honored. The risks of conversation, disclosure, encounter, dif-
135. WHITE, supra note 2, at 229-30.
136. Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After Postmodern-
ism?), 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549, 1556 (1991).
137. Id. Perhaps the reader may glimpse her presence in Martha Minow, Words and




ference, and being translated (a movement I apprehend as finally
one of the Spirit among us, with the human authors) are invita-
tions; response is up to the author, each to accept, if appropriate,
in the time of his and her own way-even should it come
unexpectedly. 138
138. See JOHN SHEA, THE HOUR OF THE UNEXPECTED (1977).
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